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A Specific Factor Analysis
of the Illegal Immigrant Issue

After considerable debate the United States has just enacted a
new immigration law aimed at restricting the inflow of illegal
immigrants.

Referred to as the Simpson-Rodino law,

the first major overhaul of U.S.

it represents

immigration law in twenty years.

The law has two major components.

Under the first,

illegal

immigrants will be granted temporary resident status if they can
prove that either they started living in the U.S. ~efore 1982 or
'

that they worked in farm labor for at least 90 days in the past
year.

Of the four to six million illegal immigrants estimated to be

currently living in the U.S.,

the Immigration and Naturalization

service estimates only one million to 1.25 million will qualify.
Under the second component, fines will .be le".'ied agai_nst employers
who knowingly .hired illegal ~mmigrants after the bill became law on
.
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November 6, 1986.
A review of the debate surrounding the bill reveals that the
arguments advanced, both pro and con, were based on the believed
income redistriSutional effects of such labor inflows rather than
their gener?l,welfare effects.

This is·surp=ising to £he economist

tamiliar with the traditional theoretical model used to analyze such
inflows (two factors of production, two products, small open economy
producing under constant returns to scale), since in this model
immigration will not affect the
non-immigrants, Mundell (1957).

income distribution of

the

The reason for this is that factor

prices are determined solely by t~aded goods prices and are
independent of factor endowments.

As noted,, these theoretical

results are, however, in conflict with the observed behavior of
lobbying groups, capitalists, professional organizations, and labor
unions who b~have as though such distributional effects did in fact
exist.
Th~ purpose of

this pa~er is to modify and extend the

traditional theoretical model to gain some insights into the
possibl~ determinants of this observed behavior and the forces that
shaped U.S. immigration policy.
stylized fa6ts.

We begin by noting the following

The owners of capital opposed the additional

restrictions on the inflows of illegal immigrants.

The owners of

l~bor supported the additional restrlctions, despite the fact that
the illegal immigrants are on average of a lower skill level than
the native population.

And, the agricultural sector was singled out

for special treatment.

In qrder to generate income distributional

effects and reflect these stylized facts,

in this paper we will

consider a three factor, two sector model that allows for some
sector specificity of factors in the short run, but not in some
longer run time period.
THE SHORT RUN
Consider two countries, the United States arid Mexico, each of
which is incompletley specialized in two productive sectors,
agriculture (AGRI) and manufactures (MAN).
employ unskilled labor and capital.
skilled labor and capital.

AGRI is assumed to

MAN is assumed to employ

While unskilled labor is intersectorally

immobile, it is assumed that

it is potehtially internationally

mobile within the AGRI sector.

Capital although perfectly mobile

intersectorally, is internationally immobile.

And, skilled labor is

both intersectorally and internationallj immobile.
competition exists in all markets.

Perfect

Prices are given exogenously

and, since in our barter economies only relative prices matter, -the
MAN sector is chosen as our numeraire.
functions

are

assumed

to

be

The industry production

linear

homogeneous,

twice

diffetentiable, and strictly quasi-c6ncave with positive marginal
products.
In light of the above assumptions the equilibrium conditions
within each of the two countries are:
r

=

YK(K 1 ,S)

=

3

pYK(K~K 1 ,U)

s = Y (K ,s)

(1)

8

1

w = pY (K-K ,u)
0
1

where:
1 = MAN

2 = AGRI
r

= uniform rental rate paid to-the mobile factor,
capital ( K)

s = wage rate paid to unskilled labor (U) in AGRI
w = wage rate paid to skilled- labor (S) in MAN
Y.= marginal product of factor i in sector j, i = U,S,K,j = 1,2
l

The system of equations contained in (1) has as endogenous variables•
the factor returns r,s,

and w,

and the sectoral employment of

capital, K •
1
With the above set of equations in mind for each of the two
countries it is possible to derive the responses of the endogenous,

I
I

variables in each counry in response to an increase in U in the U.S.
and a decrease in u in Mexico.

These changes in the U's are used to

represent the increased unskilled labor in the U.S. agricultural
sector and the accompanying decrease in the Mexican agricultural
sector as a result of the flows of illegal immigrants.
SHORT RUN QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN INCOME
After totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions
expressed in (1) holding total capital and skilled labor endowments,
and relative commodity price constant, the following expressions for
the effects of a change in the endowment of unskilled labor are
found:

where

( 2)

dK 1 /dU

( 3)

dr/dU

(4)

ds/dU

( 5)

dw/dU

t,,.

An examination of expression (2)

reveals it to be negative.

4

Thus, the inflow of unskilled labor into the AGRI sector in the U.S.
causes capital employment in the MAN sector to decline, and given
the fixed total endowment of capital, its employment in the AGRI
sector would increase.
Expression (3) is positive, indicating that the unskilled labor
inflow would lead to an increase in the rental rate paid to capital.
From expressions (4) and (5)

it is clear that the wage rates

paid to skilled labor and unskilled labor, respectively, would both
decline.

Intuitively, since skilled labor and capital must be

complements, the outflow of capital from the MAN sector causes

/

skilled labor's marginal productivity schedule and hence its demand
to decline and since the _supply is necessarily unchanged the wage
rate must fall.

In the AGRI sector, the inflow of capital does

causeunski1led labor's marginal productivity schedule and hence its
demand to increasei however, the supply of unskilled labor increases
proportionately more, so that the wage rate to unskilled labor-must
fall.
Assuming, as we have, a fixed world-endowment of each factor,
the flow of unskilled labor from Mexico to the U.S. will have a
similar but qualitatively opposite eff~ct on the factor incomes in
Mexico.

On the basis of the above res~lts.,

u.s.

capital owners

· would in general be in favor the continuation of such inflows, while
U.S. labor, both unskilled and skilled, should oppose these inflows.
In Mexico, capital owhers should be hurt by the outflows, while both
types of labor should~ gain.
ADJUSTMENT TO LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
Although the assumption of factor sector-specificity is quite
realistic for relatively short run periods of time it is not likely
to be a long run phenomena.

As such, our model will likely resolve

itself into the three-mobile-factors two goods case in which factor
competition will act to equalize sectoral returns to each factor.
Ruffin (1981) has established a fairly general theorem for the
distributional effects of a change in factor endowments in this
model.

These effects a~e d~termined completely

by

factor

intensities independent of complementarity/substitutability.

The

short-run results determined here are determined completely by the
assum~tion

of

factor

specificity

and

factor

complementarity/substitutability independent of factor intensity.
Due to the differences in what determines the direction of the
change in a factor's return in the short and long run one might
expect to find a conflict.
likely to agree.

However, in this case, they may be

Suppose that unskilled labor and skilled labor

differ most in factor usage across sectors so that they may be
labeled extreme factors.

And capital is the middle factor.

According to Ruffin an increase in the supply of an extreme factor
will benefit the middle fa6tor and hurt the other extreme factor.
Thus, an inflow of unskilled labor would lower the return to skilled
·labor (and itself) and raise the return to capital~

Thus even in

·I

. the long run, capital
:owners
would be expected to uniformly oppose
'---. __,__
-~--,-=~-:c::::..
additional restrictions and labor to uniformly favor them.

~~s---:

Of

course, if either capital is an extreme factor or unskilled labor
the middle factor, capital and/or skilled labor will experience a
conflict between its best interests in the short and long runs, the
resolution of which will depend upon their respective time rate of
discount.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have attempted to model the distributional
effects of the inflows of illegal immigrants in to the U.S. in terms
of an inflow of sector-specific unskilled labor in a three factor,
two good model.

The short-run results found are consistent with the

observed behavior of factor owners with regards to the recent change
in immigration policy.

The long-run results when the specificity

assumption is relaxed may also prove to be consistent.

NOTES
1
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wall Street Journal, November 26, 1986, pp. 1 and 15.
3

Except for the different labelling of the factors, the short

run model presented here is esentially what has come to be referred
to as the specific-factors model of foreign investment.
brief treatment of this model appears

in Caves

The first

(1971).

More

detailed analysis may be found in Ikemoto (1975), Amano (1977), and
Falvey (1979).

Dompierre (1984) provides an application of the mode

to a current trade policy issue.
4

continuing our notation YiK' j=l,2, Y~U' Y~U' Y~K' denote the

own second derivative of capital (unskilled labor) respectively, and
the cross-partial of capital and unskilled labor,
capital) respectively.

From the second-order conditions for profit

maximization we get YKK(Yuu>
productivity.

And,

(skilled labor and

<

O,j=l,2,

i.e., diminishing marginal

from the assumptions of only two factors

employed in a sector and linear homogeneity we get YKU' Y8 K> O, i.e.
the two factors are complements.

I

I

I
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